CIP-1694: Codified Law (Draft)

Divided We Stand United

The Cardano Community is dispersed throughout the world, and though historically constitutions are ratified to unite a set of people geographically, we ratify this constitution here today knowing that we may be physically, politically, and culturally divided from one another but ideologically we are united in the pursuit of a better world through blockchain technology. We use this constitution here today to prove to the world that decentralization is our strength and that we can keep our own respected beliefs while being subservient to the ethical and moral objective standards that the Cardano Blockchain has enshrined upon humanity. In this way, cryptographic technology has bridged the gap between our day-to-day subjective realities and the objectivity of ‘Code is Law’. Paradoxically, and against all common sense, we stand divided in our beliefs but united by code. The code currently infeasible to enforce or build within the blockchain is outlined throughout the rest of this document. All in hopes that we can continue to bridge subjectivity and objectivity through blockchain not only for our personal sakes, but for the sake of humanity.

Rules and Procedure of Cardano

Rule 1: Normal State Constitutional Conventions

(a) In general. The Constitutional Committee shall be considered to be in one of the following two states at all times: a state of confidence or a state of no-confidence. A constitutional convention is created by a 5/7 standing member vote. (Normal State). A constitutional convention must take place in person and the location of the convention must be announced 3 months (90 days) before the start date.
(b) Who may convene a general convention. Unless otherwise limited by superior competent authority, general convention may be convened by persons occupying positions designated in Article 1 but not sub-designated or considered an “Other” and by any representative designated by the constitutional committee concerned or empowered by a member of the committee.
(c) If new members are elected during a constitutional convention, the size of the constitutional convention cannot be increased or decreased.

Rule 2: State of No-Confidence Constitutional Conventions

(a) In general. In a state of no-confidence, members of the then standing Constitutional Committee must be reinstated or replaced using the “Update committee/threshold” governance action before any other governance action may go forward. A state of No-Confidence Constitutional Convention is created when a motion of no-confidence has passed. In order to elect a host (See Article 13 for hosting) to a new constitutional convention, a constitutional committee must be elected. (See Article 2 for election procedure)
(b) A state of No-Confidence Constitutional Convention does not need to be held in person.
(c) All newly elected Constitutional Committees will remain in a state of no confidence until they have passed a constitution, however, they will still have the ability to vote on constitutionality. The state of no confidence is symbolic.

Rule 3: Special Elections: Constitutional Committee Members who can no Longer Perform their Duty

(a) In general. A special election can be called for the following reasons:
1. A constitutional committee member is jailed or incriminated.
2. A constitutional committee falls below the minimum threshold (5/7) to ratify governance actions.
3. In the case of a constitutional committee member dying.
4. A constitutional committee member has been medically incapacitated for more than 30 days.
5. A constitutional committee member that uses a multisig wallet no longer has enough active participants to use the multisig wallet.
6. A constitutional committee member resigns.

Rule 4: Replacing the Constitutional Committee In Its Entirety

(a) The text. The constitutional committee can be replaced via a specific governance action “New Constitutional Committee”, that requires the approval of both the SPOs and the DReps.
(b) It is valid to replace the CC with no CC for 36 Epochs (180 days).
(c) The constitutional committee may be replaced via a vote of no confidence for the following reasons:
- Two or more members fail to vote on a governance proposal without abstaining from the governance proposal.
(d) Elements.
Discussion: The purpose of this section came from the community discussion surrounding the fact that several ICC members did not vote on the first governance action proposed by community member Hosky to rename Chang+1, Hosky.

Rule 5: Scope of Constitutional Committee’s Power

(a) The text. The constitutional committee is only supposed to vote on the constitutionality of governance actions.
(b) The term limit for each constitutional committee member will be 73 Epochs (365 Days).
(c) A Constitutional Committee shall be established as the branch of Cardano’s on-chain governance process that ensures governance actions are consistent with this Constitution.
(d) No governance action, other than a “Motion of no-confidence” or “Update constitutional committee/threshold” may be implemented on-chain unless the Constitutional Committee shall have first determined and affirmed through an on-chain action that such proposal does not violate this Constitution.

Rule 6: DREP Retirement

(a) The community may vote to retire a DREP credential if the DREP has not voted on a governance action for 73 Epochs (365 Days) or has missed 15 votes consecutively. The DREP will be assumed inactive.

Rule 7: Identity Verification

(a) Identity verification is required through a DREP address when running or nominating someone for a governance position.
(b) Identity verification is required when receiving funds in the amount outlined in Rule 20.

Rule 9: Ethical Limitations

(a) At this time there are no ethical limitations in place that prevent someone from being one, two, or all of the following at once: DREP, SPO, or Constitutional Committee member. Ethical limitations may go into effect subject to Rule 26.

Rule 10: Technical Requirements

(a) All Technical guardrails and requirements will be published here and will be updated within 2 epochs of any change.

Rule 11: Constitutional Committee Backup Keys

(a) The text. If a member of the Cardano Community seeks to run for a seat on the constitutional committee, they must submit a contingency plan that explains how they may transfer their keys in the case of an emergency.
(b) Elements.
Discussion: During the “Meet your candidates” twitter space, hosted by Intersect, the topic of ‘How one would guarantee their transfer of their key’ came up and was asked to every candidate. The community made it clear that a contingency plan was necessary.
(c) Explanation: There are several ways one can keep their keys safe. These include through traditional means such as estate planning, DAOs, and multi-sigs. A constitutionally appropriate plan of action will be approved by the previous constitutional committee in order to guarantee the safe transfer of keys in case of emergency.

Rule 12: Publishing of Opinions

(a) The text. Each member of the constitutional committee is required to submit at least one (1) method in which they designate a platform to publish their opinions on why they voted a certain way. Additionally, they must have a backup platform which they will publish their opinions to in the case of the first platform no longer being viable.
(b) Every constitutional committee member is required to publish their opinions at least weekly or designate a representative to publish their opinions.
(c) If a member of the constitutional committee fails to regularly publish their opinions, then the said member must abstain from voting on the legitimacy of future governance actions until their opinions are up to date. If the committee member refuses to update their opinions, the rest of the constitutional committee reserves the right to abstain from voting on all governance actions.
(d) Elements.
Discussion: During the “Meet your candidates” twitter space, hosted by Intersect, the topic of ‘How one would communicate their decisions and publish works if a member of the constitutional committee’ came up and was asked to every candidate. The community made it clear that a publishing plan was necessary.

Rule 13: Multiple Member Constitutional Committee Multi-sigs

(a) If a constitutional committee member uses a multisig wallet as a basis for voting and the active members of a multisig wallet fall below the minimum threshold to use the multisig wallet, then the constitutional committee member must resign or call a special election. Multisig wallets do not give the owners of the multisig authority to replace their own committee members without the consent of the community. (See Rule 3).
(b) Elements.
Discussion: During the “Meet your candidates” twitter space, hosted by Intersect, the topic of ‘How one would guarantee their transfer of their key’ came up and was asked to every candidate. The community made it clear that a contingency plan was necessary.

Rule 14: The Transfer of Keys if an Independent Constitutional Committee Member Is Deceased, Resigns, or is Incapacitated

(a) If a constitutional committee member is controlled by one individual person and that person is to pass away, that seat cannot be transferred to another member of Cardano without either a special election or the seat’s term expiring.
(b) If a special election is not held, during the time that the seat exists without a living, capacitated, or active member, the vote for that member will be counted as ‘abstained’.
(c) Elements.
Discussion: During a discussion with Adam Dean, the topic of ‘How one would handle the resignation, death, or incapacitation of an independent constitutional committee member’ it was made clear that a rule needed to be codified to clarify the limitations when it came to transferring the keys for a constitutional committee member who met the aforementioned circumstance and how such a member’s vote would be counted.

Rule 15: MBO’s/Legal Entity’s and Governance Actions

(a) Any MBO/Legal Entity that has an approved treasury withdrawal must fulfill all promises made by said MBO/Legal Entity concerning the withdrawal to withdraw more ADA including but not limited to the following:
1. Any milestones the MBO has promised to reach before the end of the Epoch in which the treasury’s funds will be distributed.
2. Any promised updates to text and code-based repositories such as Github.
3. Any and all other forms of notification.
4. Any promises made with undesignated or future disbursements of funds.
(b) Elements.
Discussion: During the “Q&A With ICC Candidates - Public Forum” twitter space, hosted by @TitlePendnGames, the topic of ‘How one would guarantee MBO’s did not abuse their power’ came up and was asked to every candidate. The community made it clear that a contingency plan was necessary.

Rule 16: SPO’s & Their Role

(a) SPOs shall have a specific role in approving critical on-chain governance actions which require additional oversight and independence, voting separately and independently from DReps as set forth in the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails. SPOs shall participate in hard fork initiation processes as the operators of the nodes that participate in Cardano Blockchain’s consensus mechanism.

Rule 17: Term Limits

(a) No constitutional committee member may serve on the constitutional committee for more than 146 consecutive epochs.

Rule 18: Info Actions Effect

(a) Info Actions will have the same effect as any other governance action even if not enforced via the Cardano Blockchain.

Rule 19: Limitations of Appeals

(a) Appeals cannot be made to appeal a state of no confidence.

Rule 20: Budget Restrictions

(a) Any governance action requesting ada from the Cardano treasury in excess of 1,000,000 ADA or $10,000 USD shall require periodic independent audits by the oversight committee in charge of overseeing independent audits as outlined in Article 11.

Rule 21: How and When the Constitutional Committee Votes

(a) The Constitutional Committee must vote Yes, No, or Abstain on all of the following regular Governance Actions excluding an action defined as a temperature check:
- Info Actions
- Treasury Withdrawals
- Protocol Parameter Changes
- Hard Fork Initiation
- New Constitution or Guardrail Script
- Any proposal submitted where the proposer asks for the constitutional committee to vote on the constitutionality of the proposal
(b) The Constitutional Committee does not have to vote Yes, No, or Abstain on all of the following irregular actions:
- Update Committee and/or threshold and/or Actions
- Motions that the constitutional committee believes are temperature checks on other governance actions or are stated to be a temperature check by the proposer.
(c) The Constitutional Committee is forbidden from voting Yes, No, or abstain on all of the following actions:
- Motions of no Confidence
- Any proposal to reinstate a past Constitutional Committee.
- Treasury withdrawals where no specific use case for the funds has been stated. Specific use case meaning any funds that the full amount in ADA cannot be directly tied to a specific project or benefit to the community.
(d) The Constitutional Committee must vote No to the following proposals:
- Any proposal written in a language not specified in Article 6.
- Any proposal to host a constitutional convention while a constitutional convention is in progress.
(e) The Constitutional Committee must vote Yes to any of the following proposals:
- Any proposal for a constitutional convention submitted while no other constitutional convention is taking place.
- Any proposal for a constitutional convention submitted during the same epoch as another proposal for a constitutional convention.
(f) Elements.
Discussion: This provision was asked for by Eastern Cardano Council Member Yuta via twitter.
Discussion: Example for (c3): Funds used to pay for a specific feature such as displaying an NFT within a wallet when developing a wallet is considered detailed enough to meet the requirement but funds for NFT development within a wallet is not detailed enough.

Rule 22: Not Approved Governance Actions or Unconstitutional Governance Actions

(a) A governance action that is not approved by the community or deemed unconstitutional by the constitutional committee may not be resubmitted for a period of 6 Epochs.

Rule 23: Foreign Entity Governance Actions

(a) A governance action submitted by an organization or individual with the express intent of their proposal to affect another blockchain shall be deemed unconstitutional unless the community approves that action with a voting threshold of 75% or more. In the case of this happening, any rulings of unconstitutionality prior to the end of the vote will be reversed.

Rule 24: Burning and Increasing the Supply of ADA

(a) The amount of ADA total will be 45 Billion (45,000,000,000) and will not be burnt or increased in supply.

Rule 25: Reinstating the Constitutional Committee

(a) A Constitutional Committee may be reinstated after a vote of No-Confidence has passed for the following reasons:
- No Election to replace the Constitutional Committee has been called for within 6 Epochs (30 Days).
- An Appeal in regards to Election Procedure (Article 2) has been found valid and there would be no semblance of fairness if the election results were finalized.
- An interim constitution has not been finalized within 9 Epochs (45 days) of electing the Constitutional Committee.
- An official constitution has not been finalized within 36 Epochs (180 days).

Rule 26: Sunsetting Multiple Governance Roles

(a) Community Members shall not simultaneously exercise power in more than one of the DRep, SPO, and CCM roles after the date of 31 December 2025; nor shall they subvert the intent underlying this prohibition, whether through the strategic frequency or timing of role changes, or otherwise (See Punitive Article 1).

Elements.
Discussion: Section (a) shall go into effect on 31 December 2025, upon which date section 6 will have no force or effect. This rule was proposed in a similar form via x.com by Ken Ladd. The main article can be found here.

Cardano Constitution

Article 1: Legal Entities and Titles Within Cardano Governance

(a) In general. A legal entity is defined as a designated entity within a branch forborn through the tricameral system of Cip-1694. Legally defined entities and terms for entities at the onset of this publication consist of:
- DREP
- Self-Delegation
- Constitutional Committee - We define a constitutional committee (which represents a set of individuals or entities) as a collective responsible for ensuring that the Constitution is respected.
- Interim Constitutional Committee Member
- Retired Constitutional Committee
- Constitutional Committee Member
- SPO
- OTHER:
  - MBO
  - DAO (Sub-designated)
  - Intersect
  - Voting Platform
  - Summon
  - IOG
  - Cardano Foundation
  - Emurgo
  - Node
  - Traditional Legal Entity (C-Corp, S-Corp, LLC, Partnership)
(b) Three independent governance bodies shall participate in voting for on-chain governance actions to provide checks and balances for the Cardano Blockchain consisting of Delegated Representatives (DRep), Stake Pool Operators (SPO), and the Constitutional Committee (CC).
(c) On-chain governance decisions shall be made through a collective decision-making process, with specific consensus threshold requirements as required by CIP-1694. All on-chain governance actions shall be voted upon in accordance with CIP-1694, the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails, and this constitution.

Article 2: Election Procedure

(a) In general. A period of at least 6 Epochs will be given to notify the community of an election. During the 7th Epoch, all nominations for open seats will be collected. The community will have the next 6 proceeding Epochs (Epoch 8 - 14) to vote on the candidates. At the start of the 15th Epoch, all election results will be finalized. Results will be published and finalized within the next 2 Epochs. An appeal may be made by any member of the community before the end of the 15th Epoch. In total, elections will last 60 days.
- An election for the Oversight Committee may be held for the following reasons:
  - To Establish an Oversight Committee when an entity/MBO has met the requirements outlined in Rule 20.
  - The seat held by the Oversight Committee member is up for reelection due to natural vacancy and there is a need for the oversight committee to continue to operate.
  - The constitutional committee has found the actions of the Oversight Committee to be in violation of the constitution and thus may disband the Oversight Committee.
  - A state of no confidence cannot be appealed as outlined under Rule 19.
- An election for the Constitutional Committee may be held for the following reasons:
  - The seat held by the constitutional committee member is up for reelection due to natural vacancy.
  - The constitutional committee member has succumbed to a circumstance as outlined in Rule 3.
  - The constitutional committee has reached a state of no confidence as outlined in Rule 4, section 3.
  - A state of no confidence cannot be appealed as outlined under Rule 19.
(b) Special Circumstances. In the case of emergency or special circumstances, a period of at least 2 Epochs will be given to notify the community of an election. All special circumstances will follow election procedure outlined in Rule 3.
(c) All elections must occur on-chain via a designated entity such as gov.tools. A valid entity must be approved by the Constitutional Committee and voted on by DReps.
(d) Election procedure for constitutional conventions and committees will follow all constraints outlined in Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 4, and Rule 14.
(e) Elements.
Discussion: Many in the Cardano community complained of various factors such as they did not have enough time to get to know the candidates or the election was rushed. This ensures that a very minimal but effective standard is at least in place when it comes to how elections will be run in the future.

On-chain governance, if run smoothly and correctly, creates a better form of voting than anything outside of crypto. The problem is the first election did not utilize on-chain governance to its full extent. This clarifies and sets a standard to host better elections.

Article 3: Appeals Procedure

(a) In general. The general appeals form that the Constitutional Committee or a designated entity by the constitutional committee has the power to review can be found here. Anyone may submit a general appeal.
(b) In general. If one wishes to seek an appeal to election results, they must exhibit all three tenants of standing as outlined under U.S. law.
(c) Elements.
Discussion: The elements of standing under U.S. law are as follows:
1. Injury in Fact
2. Causation
3. Redressability
Specifications: If it is found that the submitter of an election-based petition did so maliciously, fraudulently, or with ignorance of the law, they may be fined or may lose any monies in holding subject to this article.

Article 4: Governance Actions

Figure 1: Definitions & Names

Motion of no-confidence
A motion to create a state of no-confidence in the current constitutional committee
New constitutional committee and/or threshold and/or terms
Changes to the members of the constitutional committee and/or to its signature threshold and/or terms
Update to the Constitution or proposal policy
A modification to the Constitution or proposal policy, recorded as on-chain hashes
Hard-Fork2 Initiation
Triggers a non-backwards compatible upgrade of the network; requires a prior software upgrade
Protocol Parameter Changes
Any change to one or more updatable protocol parameters, excluding changes to major protocol versions (“hard forks”)
Treasury Withdrawals
Withdrawals from the treasury
Info
An action that has no effect on-chain, other than an on-chain record

(b) Any governance action submitted to Ada holders for approval shall require a standardized and legible format including a URL and hash linked to any documented off-chain content. Sufficient rationale shall be provided to justify the requested change to the Cardano Blockchain. The rationale shall include, at a minimum, a title, abstract, reason for the proposal, and relevant supporting materials.
(c) Any governance action proposal reaching the on-chain governance stage shall be identical in content as to the final off-chain version of such governance action proposal.
(d) Elements.
Discussion: What constitutes a governance action or the elements of a governance action are the following:
1. The governance action is submitted by a DREP or Self-DREP.
2. The submission meets the deposit threshold of 100,000 ADA for the governance action.
3. The governance action must be constitutional if required to be constitutional by the constitutional committee.

Article 5: Changing the Size of the Constitutional Committee

(a) In general. To change the size of the constitutional committee all three governing entities within Cardano governance must approve the change through a hard fork to the chain.
(b) All 7 members of the constitutional committee must agree to the change in size.
(c) An 80% voter threshold must be met and an 80% approval rating by DREPs and Self-DREPs must be met cumulatively.
(d) SPO’s must upgrade their Nodes to approve this change.

Article 6: Valid Proposal Languages

(a) The official dialects of the Cardano Blockchain are English, French, Japanese, Swahili, and Spanish. All proposals must be submitted in one of these languages to be deemed constitutional.

Article 7: Publishing via NFT

(a) Content. After the end of the Epoch all votes and reasons for votes must be published via a Non-Fungible Token (NFT) so that the information may be publicly available for the community within two Epochs. For each governance action passed, the following must be included in the NFT:
- A summary of the decision by all opposing and supporting members.
- Any statements a constitutional committee member has made in regard to abstaining.
- The date this decision was made and when the decision will take effect.
- Any opinions or discussions by the general community on 1694.io and gov.tools must be included in the NFT.
(b) Elements.
Discussion: This Article was asked for by @LifeIsFunThankU

Article 8: CIP’s & Hardforks

(a) Content. Hard Fork Initiation and Protocol Parameter Change governance actions should undergo sufficient technical review and scrutiny as mandated by the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails to ensure that the governance action does not endanger the security, functionality, or performance of the Cardano Blockchain. Governance actions should address their expected impact on the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem.

Article 9: Changing the K Parameter and Max Pool Size

(a) The K Parameter will be dictated by the following equation:
k = ( 35bn / 500 ) = 70m
(b) The Maximum Pool Size will be dictated by the following equation:
Maximum pool size = (45bn - reserves) with 45bn being an unchangeable amount both in supply and in this equation as outlined in Rule 24.
(c) The K Parameter may only be changed if it will incentivize 1% of the total supply of ADA (450 Million) to move pools or experience oversaturation.
(d) A proposal looking to change the K parameter will be considered unconstitutional if the only reason given to change the K parameter is to make more profit from staking.
(e) Elements.
Discussion: As of October 2022, the value of k is 500. Previously, IOG had suggested that this value could be safely raised to 1,000, but ultimately any final decision was postponed due to three factors:
i) surveying the community did not give a conclusive result;
ii) there was an IOG operational focus on delivering Vasil capability;
iii) and there was a possibly disruptive effect on ada users delegating to pools near the current saturation level so proper planning and communicating was required.
(https://iohk.io/en/blog/posts/2022/10/27/staking-parameters-and-network-optimization-where-next-for-k-and-min-fee/)

Article 10: Treasury Withdrawal Procedure

(a) To withdraw from the treasury, a treasury withdrawal governance action deemed constitutional by the constitutional committee must be submitted and valid. The community must then vote on the proposal. If the proposal is approved, the proposer may withdraw funds subject to the constraints outlined in Rule 20.

Article 11: Oversight and Independent Audits

(a) Content. If the requested funds in ADA or USD exceed the amount outlined in Rule 20, then the funds for that project must require an allocation of ADA as a part of such funding request to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ADA.
(b) The oversight committee and the independent party must agree to a legally binding contract to start fund distribution and for the duration of the fund distribution. The oversight committee and the independent party must agree to the nature of the independent audit and whoever carries out the independent audit before fund distribution.
(c) The oversight committee must establish regular reporting dates for projects which will be carried out in the form of an independent audit and report the results of those independent audits within 2 Epochs to both the constitutional committee and to the public.
(d) Anyone who receives funding must disclose their identity to the oversight committee as outlined in Rule 7(b).
(e) Elements.
Discussion: The Cardano Community has recently debated the need for an oversight committee and the concept of identity verification when it comes to large treasury withdrawals. Most notably due to a post by Richard McKraken via X in which Charles Hoskinson commented. This Article stems from that discussion.

Article 12: Electing the Oversight Committee

(a) Content. The oversight committee will be elected via the same procedure as outlined in Article 2.

Article 13: Electing a Host to a Constitutional Convention

(a) To elect a host to a constitutional convention, an info action must be submitted outlining the plan for a Constitutional Convention 120 days in advance. The community will vote on the plan and if approved, there will be an official constitutional convention.
(b) If multiple plans for hosting a constitutional convention are submitted within the same epoch, then the plan with the highest approval percentage will be deemed the legitimate constitutional convention.
(c) No Constitutional Convention may take place at the same time as another constitutional convention.

Article 14: Defining a Legal Entity for Treasury Withdrawals

(a) A legal entity to control treasury withdrawals may be chosen by the community via an info-action vote with an in favor threshold of at least 75%. If such an entity is chosen, the entity is fully responsible for any treasury withdrawals where the proposer has specified that entity will be in charge of their funds throughout the course of the proposal.
(b) The legal entity must ensure the following:
- All treasury withdrawals follow all legal requirements in the proposer’s country(s) of origin.
- Funds are distributed fairly amongst all passed proposals.
- Proposals are subject to regular audits as outlined in Rule 20 and Article 11.
- It relinquishes control of funds if not reelected to control treasury withdrawals.
(c) Elements.
Discussion: Many in the Intersect organization have expressed concern over the need to hold those who withdraw from the treasury legally accountable. After speaking with LLoyd Duhon, a financial expert and specialist within the Intersect Budget Committee via a private call, I, Kevin Mohr, decided to add this provision into the constitution.

Punitive Articles

Punitive Article 1: Failure to Disclose or Hold One Governance Role

(a) Text of Statute.
Community members have the express ethical obligation to, and thus shall prominently disclose each and any of the three roles they exercise power through.
(b) This article will go into effect after 31 December 2025. Before this article goes into effect, the community must be notified of this change via email, gov.tools, x.com, discord, telegram, forums posting, and the blockchain. The community must be notified within intervals of 1, epochs, 3 epochs, 5 epochs, 10 epochs, 20 epochs, and 40 epochs before this article goes into effect. There must be documented proof this happened otherwise this Punitive Article immediately becomes null and void. The entity responsible for carrying out this action will be a designated entity by the constitutional committee.
(c) Elements.
- That the accused willingly or unwillingly held multiple governance positions subject to the constraints of Rule 26.
- The accused sought to or failed to inform the community of holding multiple governance positions.
- The actively used these accounts after the date of 31 December 2025 for constitutionally recognized proposals
(d) Maximum Punishment.
The Maximum Punishment for violating this article is the blacklisting of all accounts associated with the said governance roles in question and a fine of up to 5000 ADA.
(e) Sample Specification.
In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), did, at , on or about _____ 20 __, while accompanying (his) (her) organization (), wrongfully hold multiple governance roles, and that such conduct was to the prejudice of the Cardano community.

Discussion: This rule was proposed in a similar form via x.com by Ken Ladd. The main article can be found here.

Bill of Rights

AMENDMENT I: CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM PRINCIPLES

The governance of Cardano will ensure that decisions are made in the best interest of the Cardano community acting in a sense like a fiduciary. The Cardano community shall uphold principles of transparency, openness, and responsible governance, promoting a culture of trust and collaboration.

AMENDMENT II: THE CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN COMMUNITY

No formal membership shall be required to use, participate in, and benefit from the Cardano Blockchain. Instead, all Ada holders are beneficiaries of the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem and, as such, are collectively members of the Cardano community. All Cardano community members are accordingly beneficiaries of this Constitution, entitled to its rights, privileges, and protections. Members of the Cardano community who hold ada are entitled to access and participate in the on-chain decision-making processes of the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem, including voting and taking part in on-chain governance regarding the Cardano Blockchain. In order to participate in governance actions, holders of ada may register as DReps and directly vote on such governance actions or may delegate their voting rights to other registered DReps who shall vote on their behalf. Any Ada holder shall have the option to register as a DRep. Any Ada holder shall be allowed to delegate their voting stake to one or more registered DReps, including themselves.

AMENDMENT III: PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE

All Ada holders shall have the right to propose changes to the governance structure of the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem in accordance with CIP-1694 and Cardano Blockchain Guardrails. All Ada holders shall have the right to ensure that the process for participating in, submitting, and voting on governance actions is open and transparent and is protected from undue influence and manipulation.

AMENDMENT IV: DREP CODE OF CONDUCT

DREPs may agree to follow the DREP Code of conduct as outlined here, however, it is ultimately up to the community to decide if the behavior of a DREP is appropriate. DREPs shall never have to swear allegiance to a code of conduct.

AMENDMENT V: MEDICAL TYRANNY

The Cardano Blockchain may be used to keep medical records but it shall not be used to enforce restrictions on any individual’s personal medical choices.

AMENDMENT VI

Transactions cannot be slowed down or censored and will be expediently served for their intended purpose.

AMENDMENT VII

The cost of a transaction should be predictable and cannot be unreasonable.

AMENDMENT VIII

The value and data users contribute and/or create will not be locked or processed without their consent. Users’ privacy, both in terms of their actions and their data, should be preserved.

AMENDMENT IX

All members of the Cardano Community shall have the right to run for any position within governance unless guilty of a disqualifying punitive article.

Sources and Acknowledgments

This document was drafted using the following material:

CIP-1694 Github
MCM
DREP Code of Conduct (Nordic Cardano Community)
Intersect Draft Constitution

Explorer

KevinMohr